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EFFECTS OF TAX REFORMS IN A SHIRKING MODEL 
WITH UNION BARGAINING 
 






In this paper we introduce a progressive income tax in the shirking model with union 
bargaining presented by in Altenburg and Straub (2002). Indeed, we differentiate taxation on 
employees and employers for the fiscal policy analysis. 
The main results show that it is possible, with a constant revenue reform, to enhance 
employment by shifting the tax imposition towards lower firm taxation. And, that it is crucial 
to consider a proportional or progressive taxation on labour income in order to be able to 
analyse the effect on unemployment for a constant replacement rate. 
  
JEL Classification:  E24; J32; J41; J51 





  Unemployment remains one of the main problems in modern economies. Factors 
such as market rigidities, temporal shocks and the distortions caused by taxes have been 
used to explain, in theoretical and empirical works, the high and persistent 
unemployment rates in OECD countries. 
  Through the analysis of the relationship between taxes and unemployment, fiscal 
policy has emerged as a possible instrument for boosting employment. Among the 
different instruments of fiscal policy we can distinguish unemployment benefits, 
regulations in the labour market, and taxes on capital, consumption and income. 
Regarding reforms in the income taxes levied on workers and firms, numerous papers 
have appeared with an aim to designing tax reforms within the labour market capable of 
increasing the level of employment. The first attempts were made in bargaining models 
with proportional taxes (Lockwood and Manning (1993) and Muysken et al (1999)). 
Afterwards, this analysis of tax reforms shifted to the field of efficiency wages, where 
the effort expended by employees was taken into account (Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), 
Andersen and Rasmunssen (1999) and Goerke (2002) among others). Among the 
different studies of tax reforms, one of the most common conclusions is that it is 
possible to reduce unemployment by restructuring the taxes levied on employers and 
employees, in favour of a reduction of the tax charge paid by firms (see Muysken et al 
(1999)). 
  On the other hand, the studies focusing on the income tax paid by workers 
lacked an important evidence in their theoretical frameworks: income tax being 
progressive in all OECD countries.  
  Recently, the analysis of tax progressivity has been introduced into the study of 
the effects of tax reforms on unemployment. Generally, most papers dealing with this 
area of study conclude that increasing income tax progressivity is good for employment. 
In union bargaining models this is so because of the reduction in the bargained wage 
through the diminution in union wage demands, due to the fact that increasing 
progressivity makes it “cheaper” for unions to buy jobs through wage moderation
1.  
And for efficiency wages models it is so because firms have incentives to lower wages 
                                                 
1  This statement is proved in Koskela and Vilmunen (1996) for the three union bargaining models: 
monopoly union, right to manage and efficient bargaining models.  4
due to the lower reduction in the effort expended by employees when progressivity is 
greater (Pissarides (1998) and Sorensen (1999)). 
However at the same time we can find references in the labour market literature 
supporting the idea that combining the efficiency wages and the union bargaining 
models reinforces their negative effects on employment (Hoel (1989), Sanfey (1993) or 
Garino and Martin (2000)). 
  The first papers to introduce taxes in a model combining efficiency 
considerations and wage bargaining were Altenburg and Straub (1998, 2000 and 2002). 
In those papers, the original shirking model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) was modified 
to introduce a decentralised wage bargaining process. Within this framework, an 
analysis of reforms in proportional taxes was made. However, for this kind of model, 
there are no results about the effects on unemployment of changes in income tax 
progressivity or in the tax structure. 
The objective of this paper is to study the effects on unemployment and 
production (for a union bargaining model where the effort expended by workers is taken 
into account) of the following reforms: individual reforms in tax parameters (to separate 
the individual effect of each parameter); and changes in the tax structure and reforms in 
income tax progressivity dealing with the problem of keeping government fiscal 
revenues at a constant level, to avoid altering the government budget. This last reform, 
those keeping government fiscal revenues constant, is crucial in the design of 
government policies. 
To this end, we adapt the model used in Altenburg and Straub (2002) to consider 
a Cobb-Douglas production function and assume neutral to risk workers. The 
complexity of the tax reforms recommended is necessary in order to be able to study 
their effects on unemployment in this kind of model for a later comparison with other 
works.  
The results reveal that it is possible to alter the level of unemployment by 
changes in the tax parameters for a constant replacement  ratio, invalidating, for a 
progressive tax structure, Proposition 2 presented in Altenburg and Straub (2002). 
Furthermore, when a revenue neutral reform is considered, it is better for employment 
to compensate for the increase in the personal tax allowance through increments in the 
marginal income tax paid by workers both for a constant replacement ratio and for a 
constant unemployment benefit.   5
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we develop the model. The 
general equilibrium is obtained in Section 3. In Section 4, we analyse the effects of tax 
reforms on the key variables of the model. The analysis is carried out for individual 
changes in each tax parameter, under the condition of constant government fiscal 
revenues and taking into account two different tax structures. The examination is carried 
out for constant unemployment benefits and for a fixed replacement ratio. Finally, in 
Section 5, we outline the main conclusions. 
 
2. The model 
  In this section we develop a theoretical model of the labour market, taking the 
following two factors into account: the minimum effort required by the firms from the 
workers and the negotiation that takes place between both parties in determining the 
gross wage.  
We postulate an economy with a large fixed number of identical workers, where 
many firms (also identical and fixed in number) operate, each of these firms producing a 
homogeneous good (whose price is normalised to one for analytical convenience) and 
employing several workers. All firms are unionised, each bargaining with its own union. 
  Decisions (for each group composed of firm, associated union and affiliated 
workers) are made in three stages. We apply the Nash bargaining solution within the 
context of the “right-to manage” approach according to which employment is 
unilaterally determined by the firms. Thus in the first stage, the wage is set by 
bargaining between the firm and its union with the outside opportunities taken as given. 
In stage two, the firm chooses the level of employment. Finally, the firm sets a 
minimum effort standard that it expects from its employees, and they in turn decide 
whether or not to comply with this effort standard. The model is solved by backward 
induction. In this paper we examine the labour market equilibrium and thus we shall 
focus on the steady state. 
 
2.1. Determining effort 
  We begin by setting a minimum effort that the workers must comply with. To 
keep the model simple, we assume that workers live forever and have the following 
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where w is the gross wage earned by workers. Given that the tax applied to workers is 
(T), the progressive structure T=t (w –c) is applied, where t>0 is the marginal income 
tax while c>0 is a personal tax allowance
2. 
Thus, w(1-t)+tc is the net wage obtained by workers. Parameter e represents the 
effort expended on a job and parameter θ is the elasticity of the effort expending 
disutility. 
In this utility function, we have considered neutral to risk individuals (lineal 
function on the after-tax income). This assumption is not only adopted for analytical 
convenience, but also because the introduction of risk aversion might bias the analysis 
in favour of tax progressivity (Sorensen, 1999) given that the model does not 
incorporate a capital market allowing unemployed workers to engage in consumption 
smoothing
3. Another assumption is an elasticity of the effort expending disutility θ>1.  
Given the individuals’ utility function and the tax structure, the firm sets a 
minimum effort standard e that will be required of their workers as a function of the 
negotiated wage. An employed worker is then faced with the decision of whether to 
shirk or not. Employees who meet this effort standard (non-shirkers) lose their job at a 
rate of δ per unit of time. This parameter is interpreted as the rate at which jobs break up 
in the economy, and it applies to all employees. Meanwhile, those workers who fail to 
meet the effort standard e (shirkers) face an additional probability of losing their job q, 
interpreted as the rate at which shirkers are detected and fired. Both rates, δ and q, are 
considered exogenous. Thus, a shirker’s best choice is to supply zero effort, while a 
non-shirker’s best choice is to exert an effort at exactly the required minimum level. 
Let us denote E
s and E
ns as the expected lifetime utilities of an employed shirker 
and non-shirker, D as the expected lifetime utility of a currently unemployed worker 
(taken as given when the firm and its employees select an effort level) and r as the 
discount rate in the economy. Therefore, the value function of a non-shirker and a 
shirker can be written as: 
    [] ) ( ) 1 ( D E
e
tc t w rE
ns ns − − − + − = δ
θ
θ
                               (1)   
                                                 
2 This kind of tax structure can be found in several papers such as Kokela and Vilmunen (1996), Koskela 
and Schob (1999), and Goerke (2002). Another well-known tax structure is that which defines the tax 
applied to workers as T=wt-c in Pissarides (1998) or Fuest and Huber (2000).  
  
3 Since tax progressivity reduces equilibrium unemployment, risk adverse workers will tend to favour 
more progressivity when they cannot smooth consumption during periods of unemployment.  7
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  The minimum effort standard set by the firm, for an employee not to shirk must 
satisfy that E
ns ≥ E
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  This expression represents the highest possible level of effort that the firm can 
demand from its workers to get them to work at every negotiated wage given D. 
However, the firm has to offer a wage that makes workers supply an effort level 
e* and meanwhile the workers have no incentive to offer anything more than the 
minimum effort required. Thus we have the case that E
s=E
ns=E (see Appendix 1 for the 
demonstration). 
Notice that for a net wage w(1-t)+ c > rD, e* is positive, increasing in w and 
decreasing in D. For θ>1, e* is strictly concave in w. 
 
2.2. The employment decision 
  In this section we proceed to the determination of the employment function 
demanded by the firm, which is dependent on the negotiated wage and the minimum 
effort standard.  
  Let N be the number of employed workers and L=eN denote the effective labour 
input. The firm’s production function F(L) is assumed to be a Cobb-Douglas one, 
adopting the functional form F(L)=L
α with 0<α<1 being the production elasticity 
regarding the effective labour. We then have a short-term production function with the 
capital taken as fixed, the value of which is normalised to one for convenience. 
  From this production function, we define the profit function of every firm 
operating in the economy through the following expression: 
  ( ) wN t N e f ) 1 (
* + − =
α
π                                             (4)  8
where tf>0 is the tax rate on labour that employers have to pay. So, it is assumed that 
this tax is strictly proportional to the wage
4.  
  The firm, with the minimum effort standard e*(w,D) already set, chooses the 
level of employment that will maximise its profit function (4). 
  The first order condition with respect to N is: 
w t N e e f ) 1 ( ) * ( *
1 + =
− α α                                         (5) 
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  This employment function is negatively related to the firm’s labour cost per 
employee (1+tf)w, and positively related to the level of effort the firm demands. 
 
2.3. Determining the wage 
  Let us now turn to the setting of the negotiated gross wage for each duality 
union-firm, in which the optimal functions for labour and effort developed above 
(equations 3 and 6) are taken into account. 
  For this purpose, we assume the wage to be the result of a Nash bargaining 
between each firm and its union, which we suppose is only interested in the welfare of 
its employed members (insiders). Hence, the objective function of the union will be the 
discounted lifetime utility of an employed worker (E), represented by equation (1). We 
assume that in the case of disagreement a worker gets the same utility as when entering 
unemployment, D. So, the union will try to maximise the difference E-D during the 
bargaining. Upon the substitution of Eq. (3) into Eq. (1), we find the union contribution 
to the Nash bargain to be: 
[] ()
δ + +
− + − = −
q r
rD tc t w D E
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) 1 (                                 (7) 
  Furthermore, the firm will try to maximise its profit function, knowing its 
employment demand is a function of the wage. Thus, we obtain the firm’s contribution 
to the Nash bargain by substituting the employment function (6) into the profit function 
(4). If an agreement is not reached, the fallback position for the firm is given by zero 
                                                 
4 An example of this kind of tax is the social security paid by firms.  9
profits. Following the Nash bargaining approach the firm and the labour union negotiate 
with respect to the wage so as to solve the optimisation problem 
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so that πN=0 and where 0≤β<1 denotes the relative bargaining power of union. The first- 
order condition for the wage determination can be written as




































≡ ρ  is the elasticity of the effort supply with respect to the 
firm’s gross wage. 
  
3. Market Equilibrium 
  In this section we show the results of a market equilibrium in space (w,u). This 
market equilibrium is obtained to be able to carry out the analysis of fiscal reforms and 
their effect on the rate of unemployment and the level of output in the economy. To 
obtain a partial equilibrium agents take the external option D as given. But for the 
economy as a whole, this option depends on the choices of wages and employment 
levels of all firms (it then becoming an endogenous variable). A first step is therefore to 
calculate the equilibrium for this. 
  Following Altenburg and Straub (2002), when unemployed, a worker is assumed 
to receive real and untaxed unemployment benefits B, finding a new job with 
probability a per unit of time. Then:     
             ( ) D E a B rD − + =                                              (14) 
Denoting the unemployment rate by u, we find that in steady state a=δ(1-u)/u 
and combining this identity with equations (2) and (14) we obtain the aggregate value of 
rD
6: 
                                                 
5 We suppose that the bargaining process takes place over the gross wage (in Altenburg and Straub (2002) 
it was over the net wage) in order to better appreciate the impact of tax reforms. 
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As we can see in expression (15), the external option rD depends on the amount 
of benefit B, the net wage and the rate of unemployment. 
  If we focus on the particular case where unemployment benefits are indexed to 
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  Substituting Eq. (16) into the optimal expression for effort reflected in Eq. (3), 
we obtain the aggregate effort supply function for the case where b is held fixed: 
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defined for 0<u≤1 and w≥0, increasing in w and u, and decreasing in b; being strictly 
concave in w and with an elasticity with respect to the wage always less than one. 
  In this model the labour force size and the number of firms are fixed. Thus, it 
can be deduced that physical labour units can be normalised so that the aggregate labour 
force divided by the number of firms is one
7. Given this, the relationship between 
effective labour input L and unemployment is: 
( )e u L − = 1                                                   (18) 
  By substituting Eq. (16) into Eq. (9), we obtain the following expression giving 
the relationship between w and u that has to be satisfied if there is an equilibrium wage 
setting: 
WS:             ( ) []
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  Note that if there is no subsidy (c=0) and the income tax is then proportional, 
equation (19) does not depend on the gross wage w, drawing a vertical line in (w, u) 
                                                 
7 This normalisation does not mean that there are as many workers as firms, each firm being able to 
employ any number of workers (units of physical labour).  11
space. For this special case of the model, the unemployment rate remains constant, as 
shown in Altenburg and Straub (2002). (Proposition 2; page 733) 
  In the same way substituting expressions (17) and (18) into (5), we have an 
equation in (w, u) space consistent with equilibrium labour demand:  
LD:          () ()
() []
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  Finally, the model is solved by the interaction of equations (19) and (20) in (w, 




The analysis of both curves lets us appreciate that the LD curve is affected by 
variations in every fiscal parameter (t, tf and c), remaining unaltered when the discount 
rate r or the union bargaining power β are modified. Alternatively, theWS curve is 
affected by variations in the rest of the parameters except tf. In addition, its slope is 
considerably altered when parameters α and θ are changed (a reduction in any of them 
decreases the WS slope).  
To be more precise, a rise in parameter t or a reduction in c has an effect on the 
wage pressure of the union, because employees demand higher wages, and the WS 
curve shifts to the left. Moreover, the labour demand curve LD also shifts upward due to 
                                                 
8 In this wage bargaining model where the elasticity of the labour demand is fixed, the equilibrium is 
unique as is shown in Altenburg and Straub (2002). In the present analysis we resolve the model in (w,u) 
space and Altenburg and Straub (2002) in (L,u) space. 
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the effect of the reforms on effort. The tax parameter tf only affects the demand for 
labour by changing the labour cost, given the negotiated wage w. Thus, a rise in tf shifts 
the LD curve downward. 
 
4. Fiscal policy results 
  In this section we proceed to the analysis of fiscal policy decisions within the 
framework of the aggregate equilibrium. The objective of this analysis is to get tax 
reforms to reduce the unemployment rate of the economy. 
The first step in this analysis is the elaboration of a base economy by giving 
values to the model parameters. The marginal income tax is specified as t=0.3, the value 
of the average of the OECD countries
9 in 2000-2001. For the marginal rate affecting 
firms, we use the average of the OECD countries for the period 1995-96, that is, tf=0.15 
(see Boscá et al. 1999). Also, we suppose a subsidy c=0.1, which allows us to obtain a 
reasonable ratio c/w for the base economy. Likewise, we fix the ratio b=0.6 as the 
average for the first year of unemployment in the OECD countries during the period 
1995-96 (see Table 2 on page 106 of Martin, 1996).
   
Regarding the selection of the remaining parameters of the model, we fix the 
same values as those appearing in Altenburg and Straub (2002): a discount rate r=0.05; 
an elasticity of the effort expending disutility θ=8; a jobs destruction rate δ=0.1 and a 
shirker employees detection rate q=0.7
10. Finally, we fix α=0.7 and β=0.3, allowing us 
to obtain an unemployment rate u=9.97%, close to the average for the OECD countries 
over recent years. 
Through these parameter values, we use the system formed by equations (17), 
(18), (19) and (20) to obtain the following results for the key variables of the model 
corresponding to the base economy: 
w u e L 
0.5983 0.0997 0.9329 0.8398 
 
From the same equations system we will analyse tax reforms in two different 
stages. First, we will consider a fixed replacement ratio b= B / Net wage. And secondly, 
                                                 
9 Average for taxes levied on a typical worker, as the sum of income and social security tax rates (see 
OECD, 2002. Taxing wages: 2000-2001). 
10 If a period of unit length is assumed to be a year, the value of the separation rate δ implies that the 
expected duration of employment for a non-shirker is 10 years, while that of a shirker, 1/(δ+q), is 15 
months.  13
we will maintain the level of unemployment benefits B fixed in real terms at its level for 
the base economy (B=0.2693), allowing movements in b. For the latter purpose, we will 
aggregate the expression B=b[w(1-t)+ct] to the equation system. 
 
4.1. Reforms in t and tf 
  Table 2 shows first the results of individual variations in the marginal tax rate t 
(leaving tf and c constant at their base economy values: tf=0.15 and c=0.1) and then we 
carry out the same exercise for variations in tf. 
Leaving the replacement ratio fixed, if the income tax rate t is reduced, the WS 
curve shifts to the left because of the increase in the net wage received by workers for 
each negotiated gross wage. That means that a higher gross wage is necessary to obtain 
the same level of employment. Moreover, the LD curve shifts upward, since for a given 
gross wage workers are more productive due to the increase in the net wage (firms can 
set a higher minimum effort standard), causing the unit labour cost to fall and the 
number of job contracts to increase. The global effect on the wage and the effort is 
moderate, but unemployment grows.  
Similarly, reductions in tf shifts the LD curve upward because, at a given w, the 
cost of labour per efficiency unit is reduced, which makes it profitable for firms to pay a 
higher wage so as to raise the effort expended by workers. As the WS curve is not 
affected by changes in tf, this result increases the negotiated wage and the effort. In our 
paper and for a constant b, the high level of θ=8 is key for the effect on unemployment 
to be small, since a lower value of θ would reduce the WS slope, and the effect on 
unemployment would, in both reforms, be higher.  
The main result is that it is possible to alter the level of unemployment by 
changes in the tax parameters (t and tf) for a constant replacement rate (b), 
invalidating, for a progressive tax structure, Proposition 2 presented in Altenburg and 
Straub (2002). If we take account of the fact that parameter c=0 (proportional taxation) 
then Proposition 2 holds. Therefore it is crucial in this type of model, with a Cobb 
Douglas function, to consider a proportional or progressive taxation on labour income 
in order to be able to analyse the effect on unemployment.   14
Table 2 
Variations in t – Impact on the variables of the model. 
Constant b Constant  B   
t u w e L tuwe   L  b
0.1  0.110  0.615 0.967 0.859 0.1 0.072 0.607 0.965 0.895 0.483
0.2  0.105  0.607 0.950 0.850 0.2 0.082 0.602 0.949 0.871 0.536
0.3  0.099  0.598 0.932 0.839 0.3 0.099 0.598 0.932 0.839 0.600
0.4  0.092  0.587 0.912 0.827 0.4 0.136 0.597 0.914 0.789 0.675
Variations in tf – Impact on the variables of the model. 
tf  u w e L tf uwe  L  b
0.05  0.101  0.661 0.944 0.849 0.05 0.082 0.657 0.943 0.865 0.549
0.15  0.099  0.598 0.932 0.839 0.15 0.099 0.598 0.932 0.839 0.600
0.25  0.098  0.545 0.922 0.831 0.25 0.124 0.551 0.923 0.808 0.647
0.35  0.097  0.501 0.912 0.823 0.35 0.161 0.513 0.915 0.767 0.691
  
By contrast, when unemployment benefit B is held constant, cutting t or tf 
increases the net wages. In addition, given a value of unemployment benefits B, the 
replacement ratio b decrease leads to an additional indirect effect. This effect stimulates 
more workers to accept the negotiated wage and, therefore, unemployment decreases. 
These results are similar to those obtained in Altenburg and Straub (2002) for a constant 
B
11. One implication of our findings is that when B is constant it is irrelevant to 
consider a proportional or progressive taxation on labour income for unemployment in a 
model with a Cobb Douglas function. 
  
Reforms keeping the fiscal revenues constant 
  Next we present the results from a new simulation exercise for tax reforms, 
considering the additional restriction of constant fiscal revenues obtained by the state. 
The reforms we have seen before are difficult to apply because they reduce 
governments’ revenues. To compensate for this reduction, governments must either 
increase other taxes, or reduce their spending, which is a difficult political task. 
Therefore, it is useful to examine how a restructuring of taxes that is revenue-neutral 
could increase employment. For this purpose we impose on the model the restriction: 
 
T= [(t+tf) w – t c](1-u)       ( 2 1 )  
where T is the government fiscal revenues, derived entirely from the employee 
population (1-u). 
                                                 
11 The same results can be obtained under the following tax structure on employees T=(wt-c).  15
 
For this particular case, the 
simulation results (see Table 3) show 
that  it is possible to enhance 
employment by shifting the tax 
imposition towards lower firm 
taxation in a shirking model with union bargaining. 
  This happens because, for this particular reform the increment in t shifts the WS 
curve to the left, due to the fact that workers need a higher gross wage to maintain their 
net wages after the increment in t (WS is not affected by variations in tf). At the same 
time the LD curve shifts upward (because the effect of the reduction in tf dominates the 
one caused by the increment in t, and the reduction in the unit labour cost makes it 
profitable for firms to negotiate a higher gross wage). The results when we consider 
constant unemployment benefits B, are similar (in u, L, e, tf). 
The most recent theoretical literature on these types of reforms shows rather 
different results for unemployment. On the one hand,  Goerke (2002) shows in an 
efficiency wage model that a revenue-neutral tax reform which increases t and reduces tf 
will raise unemployment. On the other, Koskela and Schob (1999) show that the same 
reform may decrease the unemployment rate and gross wage in a trade union bargaining 
model. We should like to point out that this issue regarding unemployment appears in 
our model although we take into account at the same time the efficiency wages 
approach. 
Similarly, when we take into account the following tax structure  c tw T − =  on 
labour income, the effects of the same tax reform leaves (u, L, e and the net wage) 
unaltered and only changes the wage. These issues are demonstrated in Picard and 
Toulemonde (2001). 
 
4.2. Changes in subsidy c 
As it is shown in Table 4, increasing subsidy c (that is, making the income tax 
system more progressive) reduces the unemployment rate
12. The explanation is that, 
when c increases, employees get a higher net wage for a given bargained gross wage. 
                                                 
12  This result is commonly maintained both for efficiency wages and for union bargaining models 
(Koskela and Vilmunen (1996), Sorensen (1999), and Koskela (2001)). 
tuwe   L  tf
0.1 0.109 0.491 0.939 0.836 0.412
0.2 0.104 0.538 0.936 0.838 0.284
0.3 0.099 0.598 0.932 0.839 0.150
0.4 0.095 0.678 0.929 0.840 0.009
Table 3 
 Reforms in t & tf: Constant fiscal revenues.  16
This encourages more workers to accept each level of negotiated wage (the WS curve 
shifts to the left) and thus a lower gross wage is required to expend the same level of 
effort (the LD curve shifts upward). The global effect on the wage and the effort is very 
small, but employment increases considerably
13. Thus, the effect on employment shifts 
completely to L. The same result is obtained for a constant replacement ratio and for a 
fixed unemployment benefit, although for the last case, the effects on the 
unemployment rate are greater through the reduction in the replacement rate (b).  
 
Table 4 
Variations in c – Impact on the variables of the model. 
constant b   constant B  
C u w e L cuwe   L  b
0.05  0.106 0.600 0.933 0.834 0.05 0.115 0.602 0.934 0.826 0.616
0.10  0.099 0.598 0.932 0.839 0.10 0.099 0.598 0.932 0.839 0.600
0.15  0.093 0.596 0.932 0.844 0.15 0.087 0.595 0.931 0.850 0.583
0.20  0.088 0.595 0.931 0.849 0.20 0.077 0.593 0.930 0.858 0.566
  
 Increasing  progressivity produced by rises in c  causes a reduction in fiscal 
revenues, so it is important to consider the restriction of constant fiscal revenues. 
If we consider reforms leaving government fiscal revenues constant, there are 
two possibilities: compensating the rises in c by increasing t or tf. As can be seen in 
Table 5, it is better for employment to compensate the rise in parameter c through 
increments in t both for a constant replacement ratio and for a constant unemployment 
benefit. Notice that in this case, the rise progressivity is somewhat bigger than when a 
boost in c is balanced with a rise in tf.. This result is consistent with recent papers on the 
effects of progressive taxation (Sorensen (1999), and Koskela and Vilmunen (1996)). 
Another interesting result is that it is possible to enhance employment leaving 
the economy production virtually unaltered by increasing parameter c when 
unemployment benefits are constant
14. This result is robust under different values of 
parameter θ. 
 
                                                 
13 The same result can be obtained under the following tax structure on employees: T=wt-c. 
14 The value of L changes after the fourth decimal.  17
Table 5 
Variations in c leaving t or tf fluctuating – Constant government fiscal revenues 
Constant b   constant B  
C u w e L tuweL  b t
0.05  0.107 0.602 0.938 0.837 0.273 0.106 0.602 0.938 0.839 0.596 0.272
0.10  0.099 0.598 0.932 0.839 0.300 0.099 0.598 0.932 0.839 0.600 0.300
0.15  0.090 0.593 0.925 0.841 0.333 0.092 0.593 0.925 0.839 0.604 0.334
0.20  0.079 0.586 0.915 0.842 0.377 0.083 0.587 0.915 0.839 0.611 0.379
C u w e L tf uweL  b tf
0.05 0.107  0.623  0.938  0.837 0.111 0.105 0.623 0.938 0.839 0.596 0.110
0.10 0.099  0.598  0.932  0.839 0.150 0.099 0.598 0.932 0.839 0.600 0.150
0.15 0.092  0.573  0.927  0.841 0.192 0.094 0.573 0.927 0.839 0.603 0.193




  In this paper, we have studied the impact on unemployment of tax reforms in a 
labour market model that combines two common explanations for unemployment: 
union bargaining and efficiency wages. For this purpose, we have adapted the model 
presented in Altenburg and Straub (2002). Concretely, we have analysed the particular 
case of constant elasticity production and we have supposed neutral to risk workers 
(which have no influence on the results). Additionally, we have introduced a tax 
structure differentiating between taxes levied on employees and employers, we have 
assumed a progressive income tax, and that bargaining takes place on the gross wage.  
The analysis consists of obtaining the aggregate equilibrium of a base economy. 
Next we proceed to the study of tax reforms considering two different stages. First, we 
have analysed individual reforms for each fiscal parameter, keeping the rest of them at 
their values for the base economy. Secondly, we have introduced the restriction of 
constant government fiscal revenues.  
Three main conclusions can be derived from our analysis. First, it is important to 
take the progressive taxation on labour income into account when changes in tax 
structures are analysed in a shirking model with union bargaining. The results of 
simulations show that, when the replacement ratio is constant, it is possible to alter the 
level of unemployment through changes in the tax parameters (t or tf). This result 
contrasts with those obtained by Altenburg and Straub (2002). In comparison, when 
unemployment benefit B is held constant, the results obtained in this work, with 
progressive taxation, are similar to those obtained in Altenburg and Straub (2002).  18
Secondly, when we consider constant fiscal revenues the effects on 
unemployment are the same as those in Koskela and Schob (1999), in the sense that it is 
possible to enhance employment by shifting the tax imposition towards lower firm 
taxation. However, we also take into account simultaneously the efficiency wages 
approach. Finally, increasing the subsidy to employees c (that is, making the income tax 
system more progressive) reduces the unemployment rate. Moreover, and for constant 
fiscal revenues, it is better for employment to compensate for the increase in parameter 
c through increases in t (instead of tf) both for a constant replacement ratio and for a 





  From equations (1) and (2), and using the condition E
ns=E
s=E, we get the 
following equations system: 
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  Dividing (A.1) by (A.2) we have: 
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And from Eq. (A.3) we obtain the optimal condition on effort: 
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Appendix 2 
  Maximising with respect to the gross wage, the following function solves the 
Nash bargaining problem: 
 
Max Ω= () [] () ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] wN t eN rD c t w f + − − + − + − 1 log 1 1 log
α β β        (A.5) 
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and, using Eq. (5) of the text, (A.7) becomes: 
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with ρ  being the elasticity of the effort supply with respect to the firm’s gross wage.  
  Hence, the first order condition (A.6) can be rewritten as: 
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which, substituting Eq. (5) into the denominator of the right hand of (A.9), is equivalent 
to expression (9): 
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